Duas visões sobre o mal menor político by García Gibson, Francisco
This is an open access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC 
BY 4.0), which permits reproduction, adaptation, and distribution provided the original author and source are credited.
Filosofia Unisinos 
Unisinos Journal of Philosophy
19(1):33-40, jan/apr 2018
Unisinos – doi: 10.4013/fsu.2018.191.04
ABSTRACT
In this article I argue that doing the lesser evil in politics is always permitted and even 
required. I call this view “pragmatism”. I defend it against “purism”, which claims that it 
is never permissible to do (the lesser) evil. I reject three arguments for purism, which are 
based on Alan Gewirth’s principle of intervening action, on an alleged epistemic difference 
between doing and allowing evil, and on rule-consequentialism. I also address Terrance 
McConnell’s and Thomas Hill Jr.’s attempts to constrain pragmatism by claiming that doing 
the lesser evil is not always permitted or required. Although those constraints may apply to 
most spheres of action, I contend that they do not apply to political action.
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RESUMO
Neste artigo, argumento que fazer o mal menor na política é sempre permitido e até re-
querido. Eu chamo isso de “pragmatismo”. Defendo-o contra o “purismo”, que afirma 
que nunca é permissível fazer o mal (menor). Eu rejeito três argumentos para o purismo, 
que são baseados no princípio da in tervenção de Alan Gewirth, em uma alegada diferença 
epistêmica entre fazer e permitir o mal, e no consequencialismo da regra. Também abordo 
as tentativas de Terrance McConnell e Thomas Hill Jr. de restringir o pragmatismo alegando 
que fazer o mal menor nem sempre é permitido ou exigido. Embora essas restrições pos-
sam se aplicar à maioria das esferas de ação, afirmo que elas não se aplicam à ação política.
Palavras-chave: menor mal, política, purismo, pragmatismo.
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Two views on political lesser evil
Duas visões sobre o mal menor político
Francisco Garcia Gibson1
Introduction
In this article I argue that doing the lesser evil in politics is always permitted and even re-
quired. I defend this view against the claim that it is never permissible to do (the lesser) evil. Fol-
lowing Thomas Hill Jr.’s terminology, I call the former view “pragmatism” and the latter “purism” 
(Hill, 1983, p. 213-214).
This article is structured as follows. In the first section I reject three arguments for purism: 
one is based on Alan Gewirth’s principle of intervening a ion, another one is based on an al-
leged epistemic difference between doing and allowing evil, and yet another argument is based 
on rule-consequentialism. In the second section I reject Terrance McConnell’s and Thomas Hill 
Jr.’s claim that doing the lesser evil is not always permitted or required. Although this may be true 
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of most spheres of a ion, I contend that it is not true about 
political a ion.2
Purism
Moral purism claims that you should never do evil, even 
if it is the lesser evil. By “evil” I mean any a ion or state of 
affairs that has disvalue.
At the core of purism is the distinction between doing 
and allowing. An agent does X when she a ively contributes 
to X obtaining. An agent allows X to happen when she for-
bears to prevent X.3
Purism strictly forbids doing evil, but it does not strictly 
forbid allowing evil to happen. One reason for this distinction 
is that a theory that strictly forbids allowing evil is in a sense 
inconsistent or not fully a ion guiding. This is because it is 
not always possible to avoid allowing evil to happen. It is per-
fectly possible (and indeed frequent) to face a choice between 
letting one evil happen or letting another evil happen, without 
there being a third option in which no evil happens. A theory 
that strictly forbids allowing evil implies that in such situa-
tions whatever you choose is (all-things-considered) wrong. 
This problem is not present in a theory that only strictly for-
bids doing evil, because it is always possible to abstain from do-
ing evil (because I assume that it is always possible to abstain 
from performing any a ion).
Purism should be distinguished from absolutism. Abso-
lutism is the view that certain evils are strictly forbidden. This 
view is held by authors such as Alan Gewirth (1981) and, ac-
cording to some interpretations, by Immanuel Kant (1996). 
My focus in this article, however, is on the more radical view 
according to which it is strictly forbidden to do any evil.
Notice that purists do not claim that agents are only 
responsible for what they do and never for what they allow. 
Purism is compatible with the claim that agents have (basic 
or derived) duties to bring about certain desirable states of 
affairs or to make sure that certain undesirable states of af-
fairs do not take place. For example, purism can be coupled 
with the view that agents have duties of beneficence, i.e. du-
ties to promote other people’s well-being. Thus, purism is 
compatible with the claim that in some occasions omissions 
can be wrong, and that we are sometimes responsible for 
what we allow. 
What purism claims is that our duties not to do evil 
always trump our duties to prevent evil from happening. 
Whenever you must choose between doing evil and letting 
evil happen, you must choose the latter. This is so regardless 
of the amount of evil that you can prevent from happening. 
Size does not matter. There is no need to even measure. In 
fact, purism should be carefully distinguished from the view 
that “doing evil is always the greater evil” (i.e. that the duty to 
avoid doing evil is always weightier than the duty not to let evil 
happen). If it were simply a matter of weight difference, then 
if doing evil could prevent a sufficiently high amount of evil, 
then the duty to avoid doing that particular evil could be out-
weighed. But the purist wants to deny even that possibility.
The absolute priority of not doing evil is understood 
in an “all-things-considered” sense. For purism it is always 
all-things-considered wrong to do evil. Purism is compati-
ble with the claim that allowing evil to happen is sometimes 
prima facie wrong, and sometimes even all-things-con-
sidered wrong. But allowing evil to happen can never be 
all-things-considered wrong when preventing it from hap-
pening requires doing evil.
The question, then, is whether purism so understood 
can be defended. In its face, purism is plainly wrong. Suppose, 
for instance, that you can save someone from being murdered 
by simply telling the murderer a small lie. Intuitively, the duty 
not to lie is overridden by the duty to protect that person’s life. 
So purism is counterintuitively strict. It is also counterintui-
tively permissive. It lets you off the moral hook as soon as you 
are required to do some minor evil in order to avoid evil or do 
good (Curzer, 2006, p. 38).
Purism is such an extreme view that it is hard to find 
arguments for it in the literature. Even Kant (who goes as far 
as saying that you must not lie to the murderer at the door) 
is not a purist in the sense that I am using here. Kant merely 
claims that some negative duties (the duties not to lie and not 
to coerce) are absolute (Korsgaard, 1986, p. 337), so he is just 
an absolutist. Moreover, it is possible to reconstruct Kantian 
philosophy as allowing for some exceptions even to those fun-
damental duties (Korsgaard, 1986, p. 346-349). Even though 
purism is not held by any author that I know of, it is import-
ant to discuss it, since many students, religious advocates, and 
others in the general public seem to adhere to it. For example, 
it is common to interpret Paul of Tarsus as adhering to pur-
ism, since he explicitly rejects the principle ‘let us do evil that 
good may result’ (Rom 3:8, 6:1).
There are at least three minimally plausible arguments 
for purism, which I now turn to assess.
2 Although in this article I focus on political action, most of what I claim applies to lesser-evil choices in other realms of action as well. 
The reason for focusing on the political realm is that lesser-evil choices are much more frequent and acute in that realm than in others. 
There are several reasons for the abundance of lesser-evil choices in politics: (a) political decisions often affect the lives of large numbers 
of people, sometimes in deep and irreversible ways; the likelihood of morally problematic trade-offs is therefore higher than in everyday 
moral choices which only affect yourself and a small number of people; (b) political action often involves coercion, which carries inherent 
risks of evildoing – and can plausibly count as an evil in itself –; (c) politics often involves intense competition, often against ruthless 
opponents, which restricts the ability to pursue morally good ends using morally unpolluted means.
3 There are at least two senses in which an agent may allow something to happen (Foot, 1978, p. 26). She may either forbear to prevent 
it (as when someone does not stop the rolling glass from falling from the table) or she may enable it (as when someone opens the flood-
gates to allow the water to pass through). I use “allow” only in the first sense, and count enabling as doing.
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Alan Gewirth’s principle 
of intervening action
Alan Gewirth’s famous article on absolute rights is 
helpful for finding a possible ground for the purist view 
(Gewirth, 1981, 1982). As mentioned, Gewirth is not purist 
because he does not claim that you should never do evil. He 
only claims that there are some evils that you should never 
do (violating absolute rights), so he is an absolutist. I consid-
er his argument for absolutism here because it can also be 
used to ground purism.
Gewirth analyses the following lesser-evil choice sce-
nario: “a gang of terrorists realistically threatens to explode 
a nuclear bomb over a large distant city unless a politically 
a ive lawyer, Abrams, publicly tortures his mother to death” 
(Gewirth, 1982, p. 1). Intuitively, it seems that Abrams must 
torture her mother to death, since this would avoid a much 
greater evil. So purism must be wrong. Interestingly, Gewirth 
argues that Abrams must abstain from torturing his mother. 
His reason is not that agents only have responsibility for what 
they do, and never for what they allow. On the contrary, Ge-
wirth believes that people’s right to life grounds positive du-
ties to protect them from homicidal projects when that can 
be done at no comparable cost (Gewirth, 1981, p. 11). And 
the cost, in this particular case, is not comparable. The death 
of Abrams’s mother by torture is clearly less costly than the 
death of thousands of people due to the atomic explosion.
Gewirth’s reason is that Abrams is not directly respon-
sible for those people’s deaths; the terrorists are. He resorts to 
what he calls the “principle of intervening a ion”, according 
to which
when there is a causal connection between 
some person A’s performing some action 
(or inaction) X and some other person C’s 
incurring a certain harm Z, A’s moral respon-
sibility for Z is removed if, between X and 
Z, there intervenes some other action Y of 
some person B who knows the relevant cir-
cumstances of his action and who intends to 
produce Z or who produces Z through reck-
lessness. The reason for this removal is that 
B’s intervening action Y is the more direct or 
proximate cause of Z and, unlike A’s action 
(or inaction), Y is the sufficient condition of 
Z as it actually occurs (Gewirth, 1981, p. 12).
Gewirth’s principle implies that if someone else is the 
proximate cause of an evil, my responsibility for that evil is 
removed. I may permissibly allow that evil to happen. But 
when I do evil, the proximate cause is me, so I a bear respon-
sibility for it.
The principle of intervening a ion seems to provide 
a defense of purism. The main problem with purism, recall, 
is that intuitively we think that there are many situations in 
which we should do minor (and even major) evil deeds in 
order to comply with our duty to avoid even greater evils. 
Now, if it is true that in those situations the greater evil is of-
ten brought about by an intervening agent, then according 
to Gewirth’s principle we do not really have a duty to avoid 
the greater evil. Therefore, it becomes more plausible to claim 
that in those situations doing the lesser evil is absolutely for-
bidden. After all, by avoiding doing the lesser evil we are not 
violating any duty at all, not even a prima facie duty. The in-
tervening agent completely freed us from responsibility for 
the outcome. (Notice that lesser-evil choices involving inter-
vening agents are frequent in politics. Consider for instance 
the case, which I mention below, of bombings against Ger-
man civil population in order to stop Hitler).
But the principle of intervening a ion is implausible. 
First, there are many counterexamples that intuitively show 
that intervening a ion does not remove responsibility. Imag-
ine that Aurora is about to intentionally run over Frank with 
her car. Frank is hearing and sight impaired, so he is complete-
ly unaware that Aurora is about to run him over. I can avoid 
his death easily by pushing him away from Aurora’s path. It 
seems clear that I have a duty to push him away, even if Au-
rora’s a ion would clearly be the proximate cause of Frank’s 
death, and that the primary duty to avoid Frank’s death is hers.
The purist may try to save the principle of intervening 
a ion from this counterexample by restricting the principle’s 
scope. She may claim that the principle only applies to cases in 
which one has to do evil in order to avoid (a greater) evil. In the 
example, by warning Frank I do no evil. But why exactly does 
intervening a ion remove responsibility only in cases of evil-
doing, and not in other cases? It seems unlikely that the purist 
can provide an adequate answer. Moreover, even Gewirth in-
advertently provides a counterexample to the claim that in-
tervening a ion removes responsibility in cases in which evil-
doing is necessary: “if someone threatens to commit suicide 
or to kill innocent hostages if we do not break our promise to 
do some relatively unimportant a ion, breaking the promise 
would be the obviously right course” (Gewirth, 1981, p. 10).
Lastly, even if the principle of intervening a ion were 
sound, it would not provide a sufficient defense of purism. 
That is because there are several lesser-evil choice scenarios 
that do not involve intervening agents. Consider, for exam-
ple, a case in which the only way in which half the humanity 
could be saved from an unforeseeable natural catastrophe is 
by a ively killing a human being. Killing her would clearly be 
the lesser evil. Now, there is no intervening a ion to release 
us from the responsibility to sacrifice her. So purism needs a 
different explanation of why in this case we must not do the 
lesser evil.
Epistemic imbalance
A further argument for purism may be built around an 
important epistemic difference between doing and averting 
evil. When an agent chooses to do the lesser evil, she is always 
fully certain that she is doing evil, but she is less than fully 
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certain that the greater evil will be averted. This is for the 
simple reason that whenever we do evil, we do evil. There is 
absolutely no chance that we do not do evil when we do evil, 
but there is always at least some chance that evil will not be 
averted when we try to avert it. For example, take Gewirth’s 
threatened politician. He has full certainty that if he tortures 
his mother, he is torturing; but he has less than full certainty 
that if he tortures he will actually be able to avoid the threat-
ened explosions. He cannot even be certain that if he does not 
torture the greater evil will actually happen. The terrorists 
may end up changing their mind, the bombs may fail, etc.
We may call this the “epistemic imbalance” between 
doing evil and averting evil. By itself the fact that there is an 
epistemic imbalance does not show much. Of course, purists 
would claim that responsible agents must not trade certain 
evil occurrence for uncertain evil prevention. But this is an 
overrea ion to uncertainty. What a rational agent should 
actually do is simply to adjust for probabilities. She must not 
simply weigh the evils themselves, but she should also account 
for the likelihood of the evils taking place. If by doing evil 
there is a sufficiently high probability of averting a substan-
tially greater evil, a morally responsible agent should do the 
lesser evil (Hill, 1983, p. 225-226).4
But the fact of epistemic imbalance is more problematic 
than it seems once we notice the incidence of biases. Prob-
ability calculations are subject to several biases, e ecially in 
politics. Consider first the “overconfidence bias” (Kahneman, 
2011). Humans tend to believe they can achieve more than 
what available evidence actually warrants (this is a sort of op-
timism bias: we tend to think that things will go better – or 
not as bad – as they statistically will). This bias may lead pol-
iticians to believe that doing the lesser evil has greater prob-
abilities of averting the greater evil than it actually has. The 
overconfidence bias can be aggravated when combined with 
forms of egoistic bias: my assessment of probabilities is prob-
ably going to be distorted if doing the lesser evil is politically 
or economically advantageous to me. Egoistic biases may also 
lead me to believe that there is a greater evil to be avoided 
when in fact there is none, or when in fact it is the lesser evil 
(when compared with the evil that my egoistic bias pushes me 
to do as means).
These biases – the purist claims – only impair assess-
ments of the evil we allow to happen, not of the evil we do. 
This is because the former happens in the future and indi-
rectly, while the latter happens now and directly. There is no 
need to determine probabilities when assessing the lesser evil 
we do. Therefore, the biases have no room to kick in.
Of course, biases can be corrected. Once we know which 
biases we are vulnerable to, we can through reflection correct 
them or adjust for them. So it seems that in particular cases it 
is always possible to know the actual chances of averting evil. 
But this is too optimistic. In real life, and e ecially in politics, 
agents do not have the time or the willingness to correct their 
own biases.
The epistemic imbalance argument is insufficient to 
support purism. The argument presupposes that when as-
sessing the evil we do we are not also subject to biases. But in 
fact biases may impair our assessments of whether a certain 
a ion is actually evil. 
For instance, assume for the sake of the argument that 
punishing thieves is not wrong at all because it is retributive-
ly just, and suppose that punishing thieves also averts a great 
evil: high crime rates. We may illustrate this by saying that 
punishing thieves would bring about 0 units of evil, since it 
is not evil at all, while not punishing them and letting crime 
rates rise would bring about 1,000 units of evil. Now suppose 
that a certain politician is a thief, and she subconsciously 
wants to avoid punishment. One possible effect of her egoistic 
biases is that she may be led to believe that punishing thieves 
is evil. So suppose she believes that punishing one thief brings 
about 1 unit of evil. And there are 10 thieves in her society, so 
punishing them would bring about 10 units of evil. Of course, 
she also wants to avert high crime rates, which is a great evil 
(even for her, since she is also at risk of being robbed). And 
punishing thieves would clearly be the lesser evil (10 units of 
evil against 1,000). Unfortunately, according to her biased 
view averting the greater evil requires doing evil. And, if pur-
ism is correct, this is impermissible. So the right thing for her 
to do (given her evidence) is to allow the greater evil. We thus 
end up with 1,000 units of evil, when with an unbiased rea-
soning we would have ended up with 0 units of evil.
Now suppose we reject purism and embrace pragma-
tism. The right thing for her to do would be to punish the 
thieves, because that is the lesser evil. Of course, this conclu-
sion would not be completely correct. The right conclusion 
would be that thieves should be punished because it is not evil 
at all (and it would avert a great evil). But still the conclusion 
would be closer to the truth than the one she would arrive 
at if she embraced pragmatism. So purism is more vulnerable 
than pragmatism to this kind of bias. This shows that there is 
no real epistemic imbalance between assessments of evil done 
and of evil allowed, since both are subject to significant biases.
Rule-consequentialism
There is also a rule-consequentialist argument for pur-
ism. The argument starts from the fact that politicians often 
lie about lesser evil justifications. They often try to justify 
evils by claiming that they are necessary for averting great-
4 Purists may claim that often in politics we are not facing unlikelihood but ignorance: we are unable to know what is the probability 
that the lesser evil will prevent the greater evil. Choice under uncertainty is different from choice under ignorance. But if we are really 
ignorant of the probabilities, then we are surely ignorant of whether there is a connection between the lesser evil and the greater evil. 
Therefore, it makes no sense to claim that we are actually facing a lesser evil choice. I agree. In cases of ignorance we must avoid doing 
certain evil.
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er evils, when in fact there are no greater evils to be averted, 
or the evil deeds are neither necessary nor sufficient to avert 
them. What would happen if everyone believed that purism 
is correct? Politicians would then have one less tool to deceive 
others. If politicians tried to justify their evil deeds by appeal 
to an alleged greater evil, people would not take that justifica-
tion as valid. The world would be a better place.
For rule-consequentialist reasons, then, we should act as 
if purism were the right rule to assess evil deeds. We would 
then avoid a lot of “false positives”, i.e. a lot of alleged lesser-evil 
justifications which are unsound. Of course, if purism were 
believed to be correct, then we would have the opposite prob-
lem of having “false negatives”, i.e. cases in which we would 
not let politicians do evil when in fact it would be better if 
they did (in order to avoid a greater evil). Still, the rule-conse-
quentialist argument claims that the aggregate harmful effect 
of false negatives is far outweighed by the aggregate harmful 
effect that false positives would have if purism were rejected. 
In sum, believing in purism is the lesser evil.
Is it? It is not clear at all that the aggregate harm from 
false positives actually outweighs the aggregate harm from 
false negatives. To begin with, it is hard to realistically assess 
how many alleged lesser-evil justifications are actually false 
positives. In fact, it is precisely for that reason that politicians 
abuse that tool. Moreover, the risk of false negatives should 
not be minimized. World War II would probably have been 
lost to Germany if the Allied politicians had not been allowed 
by their citizens to use evil means to fight. For instance, some 
argue that bombing German cities was a necessary means to 
win (at least the initial bombings; but the rest were clearly 
unnecessary) (Walzer, 1977, p. 259-261). Moreover, purism 
implies that all defensive wars are impermissible, since even 
defensive wars require at least some evildoing in the form of 
harm to innocent bystanders. So the rule-consequentialist ar-
gument is either impossible to assess or it implies that actually 
purism is the theory that should be rejected.
Pragmatism
Rejecting purism does not imply that pragmatism is cor-
rect. Some argue that political agents are not always allowed 
or always required to do the lesser evil. We may call this view 
“limited pragmatism”. In this section I argue that limited prag-
matism is wrong.
The pro tanto case for always doing the lesser evil is quite 
straightforward (Hill 1983, p. 214). If an agent must choose 
between two (or more) evils, and one of them is the lesser evil, 
then it follows that all other things equal she must choose the 
lesser evil.
Limited pragmatists argue that sometimes other things 
are not equal, and that there are reasons for setting limits on 
lesser-evil doing. These reasons may be of two different kinds: 
internal and external.
Internal reasons are reasons for claiming that what 
seems to be the lesser evil is actually the greater evil. When 
weighing two evils an agent may wrongly assess their relative 
weight, for example by failing to consider relevant reasons 
that make one of them a more serious evil. In such cases, an-
other agent may point to those missing reasons in order to 
revise the assessment (or the agent may find out about those 
missing reasons herself ). For example, imagine you have a 
friend whose presence could ruin the party you are planning 
for tonight at your house. You could lie to her and tell her that 
there is no party tonight. And you think that lying would be 
the lesser evil, because the suffering she will endure when she 
finds out about the lie is outweighed by the joy everyone will 
have at the party if she is not there. Now someone could try 
to set limits on your lesser-evil reasoning by pointing out that 
there is a reason you failed to adequately consider: lying is 
evil not only because it causes suffering but also because it is a 
quite serious offence to your friend’s dignity, and it is actually 
the greater evil in this case. I call this kind of reasons “internal” 
because they are internal to the assessment of which of the 
alternatives is a greater evil. External reasons, on the other 
hand, are general reasons against always doing the lesser evil 
(the actual lesser evil). Once we have weighed two competing 
evils adequately, there may still be reasons to avoid doing the 
one that is the lesser evil. These reasons are “external” because 
they are independent from (or fall outside of) the assessment 
of relative evil, and they are independent from the particular 
evils in play. (For examples of external reasons, see below).
In defending pragmatism what matters are external rea-
sons. The pragmatist is indifferent to which particular evil is 
the lesser evil in a given case (and why). She simply claims 
that whichever is the lesser evil, doing it is always permissible 
and even mandatory (at least in politics). This view was held 
most famously by Machiavelli (1950), and recently by Kai 
Nielsen (2000) and others. (Notice that pragmatism is com-
patible with non-consequentialism. Non-consequentialism is 
the view that what makes an a ion evil is not only its conse-
quences, but also other non-consequentialist considerations 
such as the fact that the a ion breaks a moral rule. Now, 
what defines pragmatism is not the kinds of considerations 
that it allows – consequentialist or not – but how it deals with 
conflicts between two or more considerations that require ac-
tions, as opposed to mere omissions).
Limited pragmatists put forward a number of external 
reasons for limiting lesser-evil doing. I argue that some of 
those reasons are not valid (section “Invalid reasons”), and 
that the ones that are valid only apply to some spheres of hu-
man a ion and not to political a ion (section “Valid reasons 
that do not apply to politics”).
(Notice that limited pragmatism is different from abso-
lutism. While absolutists claim that certain types of a ion 
are never permissible, limited pragmatists merely say that 
doing the lesser evil is sometimes impermissible. While an 
absolutist may claim that, for example, murdering innocent 
persons is always wrong, the limited pragmatist merely claims 
that murdering innocent persons may sometimes be wrong, 
even when it is the lesser evil.)
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Invalid reasons
Consider first Terrance McConnell’s arguments for 
limiting lesser-evil doing. He claims that doing the lesser evil 
is impermissible when it irreparably violates a right (McCo-
nnell, 1981, p. 551).5 Notice that McConnell is not a purist. 
He grants that there are cases in which the lesser evil must 
be chosen, e ecially when no rights are irreparably violated 
and compensation is possible (McConnell, 1981, p. 546-547). 
So he is just a limited pragmatist.
McConnell provides two grounds for his view. First, he 
claims that if irreparable rights violations were allowed (in 
order to do the lesser evil), then victims would be treated as 
means only. This is not the case, he claims, if we only allow 
reparable rights violations (McConnell, 1981, p. 552). McCo-
nnell may be right about this, but he is beside the point. He is 
only providing an internal reason for not doing (what seems 
to be) the lesser evil. A reason for counting irreparable rights 
violations as the greater evil. So it cannot be a reason against 
(unlimited) pragmatism.
Another problem with McConnell’s claim is that ir-
reparably violating a right is often necessary to avoid other 
people’s rights to be irreparably violated. To this objection he 
answers that irreparably violating a right myself is always a 
greater offence than allowing someone else to irreparably vio-
late the rights of others (McConnell, 1981, p. 552).
To back his claim, he offers the following example. Sup-
pose that someone will torture A and B unless you torture C. 
If you do not torture C, then A and B could complain to you. 
However – McConnell points out – their complaint would 
be much softer than the complaint C would address to you 
if you tortured her in order to save A and B (McConnell, 
1981, p. 554). I think McConnell is right in his analysis of this 
particular case, but this case alone is not enough to support 
his claim. If the number of people I could save from torture 
were substantially higher, then their complaint would certain-
ly be stronger than C’s complaint for torturing her. So it is 
not the case that violating a right myself is always a greater 
offence than allowing someone else to violate others’ rights. 
Moreover, even if McConnell were right about which would 
be a greater offence, he would still be talking about internal 
reasons, not external reasons.
Second, McConnell argues that if rights could always 
be permissibly violated in order to avert a greater evil, then 
“the possession of rights would be of little value” (McCon-
nell, 1981, p. 554). This is a proper external reason. It is not 
a reason for regarding something as a greater or lesser evil, 
but a reason for not allowing certain lesser evils. However, it 
is not a good reason. Having rights can still be of great value 
even if irreparably violating them is allowed in some cases. 
Indeed, rights require that only substantially greater evils must 
be averted for a rights violation to be justified. Irreparably 
violating my right to life cannot be justified if just five lives 
could be saved (as in Judith Jarvis Thomson’s transplant case 
[Thomson, 1985, p. 1396]). Only if the number of lives that 
can be saved is substantially higher may my right be violated. 
So rights do have great value.
Another author that claims that there are reasons for 
not always doing the lesser evil is Thomas Hill Jr. The first 
reason he provides is that humans have a desire to relate to 
others with mutual re ect, caring, and support. Doing evil 
to others, even if it is the lesser of two evils, squelches that 
desire. So a way to cherish this important desire is to restrict 
the requirement to always do the lesser evil. Thus, Hill claims 
that the lesser evil should be done only if it would prevent a 
substantially greater evil (Hill, 1983, p. 226). Second, the re-
quirement to always do the lesser evil runs counter to our de-
sire for moral integrity. We want our acts to express the values 
we are internally committed to. When we do evil (even if it is 
the lesser evil) there is a lack of cohesion between our inner 
convictions and our outer deeds. Since the desire for integri-
ty should also be cherished, there are reasons to restrict the 
requirement to always do the lesser evil (Hill, 1983, p. 226).
Both reasons are problematic because they miss the way 
in which those two desires would be cherished by doing the 
lesser evil. It is true that when we do the lesser evil to some-
one, we are unable to relate to her with re ect, caring, and 
support. But at the same time we are preventing a greater evil 
from befalling others. This shows re ect, caring, and support 
to them. There is no reason to think that the lack of re ect 
that we show towards the lesser evil’s victim is higher than 
the lack of re ect we would show to the greater evil’s victims 
by doing nothing to stop it. For the same reason, not doing 
the lesser evil would also show a lack of integrity. Important 
inner values would be left unexpressed, such as the value that 
each individual’s life and suffering matter. Since the evil we 
are preventing is the greater evil, it seems that our integrity is 
even more compromised when we avoid doing the lesser evil 
than when we do it.
Valid reasons that do 
not apply to politics
Hill offers two additional reasons to restrict the duty to 
always do the lesser evil. First, he claims that there is value in 
having a well-defined set of responsibilities. Knowing in ad-
vance what our duties are is helpful in order to define our lives 
around them (Hill, 1983, p. 22). This value is threatened if we 
have a duty to always do the lesser evil. We become perpet-
ual policewomen and policemen of evil, always on call, with 
a high degree of unpredictability about what our duties are. 
Second, Hill argues that a requirement to always do the 
lesser evil is incompatible with having  ecial relations. There 
is moral value in having relationships that are based on love, 
5 McConnell restricts his claims to moral blackmail cases, not to straightforward human evil nor to natural evil cases (1981, p. 544-545).
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friendship, and mutual re ect. But in order to work, these 
relationships require an almost unconditional commitment. 
And such commitment would be undermined by the duty to 
always do the lesser evil. As Hill explains, people would only 
be able to make conditional commitments with each other: 
“I would never lie to you, beat you, kill you, etc... unless I found 
that doing so would prevent a more serious offense some-
where else” (Hill, 1983, p. 226-227).
Both reasons Hill offers are valid for limiting the re-
quirement to do the lesser evil. However, they only apply to 
some spheres of human a ion. Not to political a ion. Con-
sider first the reason from autonomy. As part of their role, 
political actors acquire  ecial obligations. As a politician 
you voluntarily lay down your right not to be always on call. 
You are now doing public service. It is part of your job de-
scription. Now consider  ecial relations. It is true that per-
sons are under no requirement to always do the lesser evil, 
because otherwise they would not be able to have valuable 
 ecial relations. But this claim is perfectly compatible with 
saying that politicians acquire  ecial obligations as part 
of their role. It is common knowledge that when you en-
gage in politics, your personal relations suffer. For example, 
when holding office your family and friends can no longer 
demand preferential treatment. Favoritisms (nepotism and 
cronyism) are prohibited by your job description. Similarly, 
it could be argued that if you agree to become a politician, 
you are required to always do the lesser evil, even at the cost 
of losing valuable personal relations.
Notice that the view on political duties I have just pre-
sented is different from standard political realism. According 
to realism, when compared to other individuals politicians 
have wider permissions: they are entitled to do a ions that 
common morality prohibits. What I hold, on the contrary, is 
that politicians have fewer permissions. They are not entitled, 
for the sake of autonomy and personal relations, to evade the 
requirement to do the lesser evil. 
For the same reason, the view I am introducing here 
seems compatible with political moralism. Morality and pol-
itics are not substantially different. Politicians simply have 
more responsibilities than other persons. Notice that moral-
ism grants that roles are legitimate grounds for  ecial obliga-
tions. Moralism only denies that role duties may conflict and 
trump general moral obligations. My view is compatible with 
this assertion.
It may be countered that amongst politicians’ addi-
tional responsibilities comes a strict duty to obey the law, 
e ecially in constitutional democracies. Therefore, less-
er-evil a ion involving law-breaking cannot be defended by 
the argument from politicians’ additional responsibilities.6 
In response, it must be noticed that not all lesser-evil ac-
tion involves law-breaking. Consider some examples: lying 
in political negotiations, betraying your political allies or 
making a legislative decision that is socially unjust towards 
a group. None of these acts are illegal, but they are still evil 
in a moral sense. Therefore, even if we grant that politicians 
are not allowed to break the law in order to do the lesser 
evil, it must be granted that legal lesser-evil acts in politics 
are permissible. 
Conclusion
In this article I have argued that in politics doing the 
lesser evil is always permissible and required. The three ar-
guments for purism that I have assessed are problematic. 
First, intervening a ions do not completely eliminate re-
sponsibility, and not all lesser-evil choices involve interven-
ing a ions. Second, there is no strong epistemic imbalance 
between doing evil and averting evil; biases not only impair 
assessments of evil consequences but also assessments of 
whether an a ion is an actual evil. Third, it is not clear that 
rule-consequentialism supports purism and it may even 
support pragmatism.
Arguments for limited pragmatism are also problemat-
ic. Some of the reasons for limiting pragmatism that I have 
analyzed do not really  eak against doing the lesser evil, but 
against counting certain particular evils as lesser or greater 
evils. These are simply internal reasons. The proper external 
reasons I have assessed (autonomy and  ecial relations) suc-
cessfully show that there is no general requirement to always 
do the lesser evil. However, I have argued that political agents 
are nevertheless under that requirement.
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